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THE CASE FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL, UNIVERSAL AMNESTY
FOR DRAFT EVADERS AND ARMED FORCES DESERTERS
"What does the soldier want?"
"To kill! To kill!"
"What are you?"
"Soldiers!"
"What are you, really?"
"Tigers!"
"What do you eat?"
"Raw meat!"
"What do you drink?"
"Red blood!"
"Whose blood?"
"Gooks' blood!"1
That chant reverberates throughout Fort Sill when basic training
drills are conducted. Many soldiers learned their basic training les-
sons well and applied their knowledge in Vietnam.
William Whitmeyer, for one. He served with the 172nd Armored
Regiment in Vietnam. One memory of his service in Vietnam is his
participation in the murder of twelve Vietnamese villagers. Some of
the villagers were women, and all of them were more than sixty years
old.
No one had to answer for it. I never heard any more about it,
except in the Stars and Stripes I read that the 69th Armored near
Bong Son had killed twelve VC. The officers thought it had been a
good way to release tension and get some kills. They were always
pushing our unit for kills, more kills.2
Jerry Samuels was in the 65th Engineers Battalion in Vietnam. His
unit also slaughtered civilians-even after battles subsided:
Things calmed down, and me and one of the buck sergeants
and two other guys took these four chicks in the elephant grass out-
side the perimeter, and we were all fooling around. We balled these
chicks. They were forcibly willing-they'd rather do that than get shot.
Then one of the girls yelled some derogatory thing at the guy who'd
balled her, in Vietnamese, but he knew what it meant. He just
reached down for his weapon and blew her away. Well, right away
the other three guys who were there, including myself, picked up our
1. A. STAPP, Up AGAINST THE BRAss 20-21 (1970).
2. IR. WILLIAMIS, THE NEw EXILES 270 (1971).
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weapons and blew away the other three chicks. Just like that. It was
a spontaneous, instantaneous type thing.3
The experiences of William Whitmeyer and Jerry Samuels can-
not be dismissed as unfortunate aberrations of the Vietnam war. Simi-
lar incidents have occurred frequently in Vietnam, and there is evi-
dence that they "were a logical outgrowth of established United States
military tactics." 4
Whitmeyer and Samuels did not stay in Vietnam to continue to
carry out United States military tactics. They deserted, and both are
now exiles in Canada.
They are not alone. There are thousands of deserters in Canada
and other countries who have had similar experiences.5 And there are
3. Id. at 276. See, e.g., VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, THE WINTER
SOLDIER INVESTIGATION: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN WAR CRIMES (1972); T. TAYLOR,
NUREM6BERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1971); S. HERSH, Mv LAI 4
(1971).
4. Comment, My Lai Massacre: The Need for an International Investigation, 58
CALIF. L. REv. 703, 724 (1970). Three military practices in particular are noted as
encouraging or condoning the mistreatment of civilians:
In the first place, the Army designates entire areas of suspected enemy
activity as "free fire zones," in which any person, regardless of sex or status,
is automatically considered a Viet Cong sympathizer and can be killed at a
soldier's virtually unbridled discretion. Moreover, United States military leaders
encourage high "body counts" as evidence of war gains; some brigade com-
manders run contests in which privileges are awarded to companies that register
the most kills....
Secondly, reports of various informed sources allege the use of torture,
maiming, terror, and murder as relatively routine United States policies, and
assert that license to commit such atrocities originates in "orders from higher
up."
Third .. .some sources contend that the United States air war in Vietnam
is conducted with utter disregard for civilian welfare. They cite the repeated
American bombing attacks upon a Vietnamese leprosarium and upon the
Huong Phuc school as examples of the targets pounded daily during the raids
of North Vietnam.
Id. at 725.
5. In one study of twenty draft evaders and ten deserters, the following reasons
were given for rejecting a role in the war:
1. They view participation in the Vietnam War as immoral; they said
that they would feel ashamed to have to admit to their children that they had
participated.
2. Having been raised to cherish autonomy, self-direction, and individual
responsibility, they reject authoritarianism and question the motives underlying
the U.S. use of power.
3. They see the Vietnamese, and other people, as human beings and
don't buy the Madison Avenue techniques of dehumanizing them .... [Tihey
see much of this as racist propaganda.
4. They perceive war in the nuclear age as barbaric and stupid.
5. They condemn the U.S. value system and argue that today's society is
not worth saving.
R. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 337-38.
COMMENTS
thousands of draft evaders who did not need direct experience in the
war to decide that they wanted no part of it.6
Since these men face legal sanctions if they return to the United
States, amnesty for the exiles "is an issue which plainly is going to have
to be dealt with in Washington." 7 Legislation to provide amnesty for
draft evaders recently has been introduced in the Senate and House
of Representatives.8 The public debate on the issue of amnesty is
just beginning.
One hesitates to analyze the issue of amnesty in a "scholarly"
manner, fearing that the analysis may conflict with the initial, emo-
tional response that no humane nation could punish men like Whit-
meyer and Samuels because they refused to continue to kill in Vietnam;
too often one has "the eerie feeling that the legal scholars are not
concerned with the same war as described by observers like Fall and
dramatized nightly on Huntley-Brinkley." 9
Fear not. The "scholarly" analysis for amnesty only confirms the
more emotional reaction in favor of amnesty. Before directly proceed-
ing with that analysis, however, a brief examination of the two forces
which drove so many Americans into exile is necessary. Those forces,
of course, are conscription and the war in Vietnam.
6. Estimates of the number of exiles are as follows: 70,000, TIME, Jan. 10; 1972,
at 15; 75,000, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1972, at 19; 100,000, R. WILLIAMS, supra note 2,
at 4.
7. Wicker, In the Nation: The Cost of Conscience, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1969,
at 44, col. 4.
8. Three different proposals for amnesty have been embodied in legislative form:
S. 3011, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), is the bill introduced by Sen. Taft (R-Ohio).
It does not cover deserters, and draft evaders must work for three years at alternate
service before receiving amnesty.
H.R. 12417, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), is the bill introduced by Rep. Koch
(D-N.Y.). It does not cover deserters, but the required period of alternate service is two
years rather than three.
H.R. 14175, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), is a bill introduced by Rep. Abzug (D-
N.Y.). It provides a general amnesty for deserters as well as draft evaders, and it is
unconditional.
Amnesty opponents have introduced resolutions in Congress to prohibit amnesty
for draft evaders and armed forces deserters. Rep. Garmatz (D-Md.) introduced H.R.
Con. Res. 526, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), and 17 other Congressmen have introduced
identical or similar measures. The resolution provides:
That it is the sense of Congress that no pardon, reprieve, or amnesty be
enacted by the Congress or exercised by the President with respect to persons
who (1) are in violation of the Military Selective Service Act because of their
refusal to register for the draft and/or their refusal to be inducted, or (2) being
a member of the Armed Forces, fled to a foreign country to avoid further
military service in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
9. Robertson, The Debate Among American International Lawyers About the
Vietnam War, 46 TExAs L. REv. 898,,913 (1968).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
I. CONSCRITON
A. The Constitutional Opposition and Subsequent Tradition Against
Conscription
There is a widespread belief in America that compliance with
conscription laws is an American's time-honored obligation to his
country, and that resistance to the draft is "un-American."' 0 However,
the opposite is actually the case: the American tradition is one of
strenuous opposition to all forms of involuntary servitude, including
conscription."
Although the colonial militia system has been cited as a precedent
for conscription, that system was not similar to modern conscription.1
2
In fact, conscription was one of the few issues on which there was
unanimity at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention in 1787.13
Conscription "was so impossible to imagine, given the circumstances
and ideological climate of the times, that no voice was raised against
it."'14 Even those delegates who wanted the strongest powers for the
central government excluded consideration of the power to conscript.
It was not until the War of 1812 that the first major effort to enact
a draft law occurred. Secretary of War Monroe proposed to "call a
designated number out of the population between the ages of 18 and
45 for service in the army."'15 The prevailing view in Congress, how-
10. Senator Paul Fannin is opposed to amnesty because exiles "have turned their
backs on their country." Letter from Senator Paul Fannin (R-Ariz.) to William Wick,
Jan. 24, 1972, on file in the editorial offices of the Buffalo Law Review.
11. Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
67 MicH. L. REv. 1493 (1969).
12. The analogy between the militia system and conscription was drawn in Arver
v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1917). However, Friedman cites the following
distinguishing characteristics of the militia system:
(1) the primary compulsory aspect of the militia was the requirement to
train; (2) the militia was fundamentally a defensive force; (3) continuous
service was required solely during periods of emergency; (4) service outside
the colony was for outcasts only; and (5) the trend was away from compulsion
in the years preceding the Revolution.
Friedman, supra note 11, at 1506.
13. Friedman, supra note 11, at 1514. Even Edmund Randolph, Governor of
Virginia, was opposed to conscription. Randolph expressed the views of Federalist
delegates who wished to concentrate power in the federal government, but even he felt
that- conscription "stretched the strings of government too violently to be adopted." Id.
at 1513.
14. Id. at 1519.
15. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 385 (1917).
314
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ever, was that the federal government did not have the power to con-
script, and the proposal was defeated.'
In the midst of the Civil War, the first American draft law was
passed. 7 The first American draft resistance occurred shortly there-
after. Although the Act stipulated that a drafted man could hire a
substitute or literally buy his way out of the draft,' many men could
not afford to purchase their way out of forced service. As a result, riots
against the draft occurred throughout the country, with the largest
protest in New York City causing 1,200 deaths.' 9 In addition, some
state and local governments supported the citizens' opposition to the
new conscription law.20
The most popular means of opposing the draft, however, was
draft evasion. It was so popular that a new word-"skedadling"--was
created to describe it. New towns were built in Canada to accommodate
thousands of "skedadlers." 21
16. Friedman, supra note 11, at 1541.
The debate over the draft proposal in 1814 was the occasion for one of Daniel
Webster's famous speeches against the draft. An excerpt is worth noting:
Is this, sir, consistent with the character of a free government? Is this civil
liberty? Is this the real character of our Constitution? No, sir, indeed it is not.
The Constitution is libelled, foully libelled. The people of this country have
not established for themselves such a fabric of despotism. They have not
purchased at a vast expense of their own treasure and their own blood a Magna
Charta to be slaves. Where is it written in the Constitution ... that you may
take children from their parents, and parents from their children, and compel
them to fight the battles of any war in which the folly or the wickedness of
government may engage it? 14 THE WRITINoS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL
WEBSTER 61 (1903).
17. Act of Mar. 8, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731.
18. Id. at § 13, 12 Stat. 733.
The substitution option caused one historian to conclude that the draft law "was
not a conscription bill in any general sense; it was merely a piece of class legislation
designed, even in the last resort, merely to stimulate mercenary enlistments and to match
the rich man's dollars with the poor man's life." 1 F. SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION
AND ADmINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865, at 308 (1928).,
'19. Friedman, supra note 11, at 1545.
20. The state of Delaware and the city of Troy, New York, for example,
passed laws authorizing the local government to pay the commutation fee for
residents, and the Governor of Massachusetts asked the Secretary of War to
suspend operation of the draft in that state for six or seven weeks because a
sufficient number of substitutes could not be found.
Id.
21. 2' F. SHANNON, supra note 18, at 184-85. The total number of "skedadlers"
may have been as high as 200,000. Id.
The Supreme Court did not hear any cases challenging the Civil War draft law,
but Chief Justice Roger Taney did prepare an outline of an opinion declaring the law
to be unconstitutional. Friedman, supra note 11, at 1546.
A strange case did come before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the draft law,
however. In Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863), three men sued the local enrolling
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
' In April, 1865, the draft law expired and conscription was not
used again for more than half a century. In 1917, United States entry
into, World. War 'I prompted a government proposal to conscript
again. Even though war had already been declared on Germany, oppo-
sition to the draft was vocal. Speaker of the House Champ Clark
proclaimed:I protest with all my heart and mind and soul against having
the slir of being a conscript placed upon the men of Missouri. In the
estimation of Missourians, there is precious little difference between
a conscript and a convict
22
Nevertheless, the Selective Service Act was passed on May 18,
19 1 7,23 The draft again lasted only as long as the war, however, and
throughout the 1920's and 1930's proposals for conscription were con-
sistently defeated in Congress.24
In 1940, after the Nazis had defeated the French, Congress
adopted a draft-the first peacetime draft in American history.2- The
draft was extended three times following the war, but it finally ex-
pired on March 31, 1947. Conscription was reintroduced sixteen
months later when Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948.
In 1951, the title of the Act was changed to "The Universal Military
Training and Service Act," and from 1951 to 1971 the draft was ex-
tended by Congress every four years.26 In 1971, the draft was extended
for two years.
Thus, American conscription is a modem institution. During the
first 150 years of the nation's history, draft laws were in effect for only
board to enjoin the board from enforcing the conscription law. On November 9, 1863,
the court announced in a 3-2 decision that the law was unconstitutional, and the in-
junctions were issued. The Chief Justice's term expired on December 12, 1863, however,
and the Chief Justice (who bad voted with the majority) was replaced by a man
named David Agnew, who favored the draft. The government moved to vacate the
injunctions before the Agnew court, and on January 16, 1864, the court's initial order
was vacated by a predictable 3-2 margin. Friedman, supra note 11, at 1548-49.
22. H. PBTERSON & G. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR, 1917-1918, at 22 (1957).
23. 40 Stat. 76 (1917). The Act was formally titled "An Act to authorize the
President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States." Id.
24. Friedman, supra note 11, at 1552.
25. 54 Stat. 885 (1940). This act was also upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Tatum
v. United States, 146 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1944); United States v. Herling, 120 F.2d 236
(2nd Cir. 1941).
1 It is noteworthy that the Congressman who introduced the 1940 draft bill made
it clear that the act was "not an attempt to establish a permanent policy in the United
States." Gillam, The Peacetime Draft, 57 YALE REv. 495, 502 (1968).
26. It is no accident that the draft is renewed in an odd-numbered year. There
are neither Congressional nor Presidential elections in odd-numbered years.
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four years. Since World War II, however, Congress has maintained
the draft.27
B. The Modern Draft: Involuntary Servitude Unfairly .Administered
The reason our Constitution-makers did not even consider fed-
eral conscription is a simple one. As Senator Mark Hatfield put it,
"[c]onscription is involuntary servitude. It is complete usurpatfion by
the Government of an individual's freedom of choice. .28
Originally conscription was instituted only while America par-
ticipated in a declared war;29 today, the draft has come to justify itself
in the name of "national security." 30 Regardless of the justifications,
however, one fact remains: conscription is involuntary servitude.
Realizing the totalitarian nature of conscription per, se, it is note-
worthy that even the administration of the draft in the United States
is unjust. Administrative inequities serve to exacerbate the inherent
injustice of conscription.
Local draft boards are the heart of the Selective Service System,
and the boards are also the System's major weakness. Board m6mbers
27. The rationale for retaining the draft in the decades following World War II
has come under frequent attack. One connentator has argued that the draft has been
detrimental to our security:
The fact is the United States is the most powerful state in the whole.
history of the world, both in an absolute sense, and in relation to contem-
porary states. There is no threat to us, no challenge to our national interest.
Yet, in order to "defend" ourselves, we are committed to a system of
"national security," introduced in 1947, which has come to control the
national priorities and much of the national economy. In the process-we have
lost over 100,000 American lives; we have caused the destruction of at least
two million and perhaps as many as four million non-Americans .... What
kind of defense policy can that be for the nation whose arsenal equals that of
most the rest of the world?
T. REEvEs & K. HEss, THE END OF THE DRAFT 128 (1970).
28. Hatfield, The Draft Should Be Abolished, SAT. EvE. POST, July 1, 1967, at 12.
29. Mr. Justice Murphy emphasized the importance of tolerating conscription only
in times of grave national duress in a 1944 dissenting opinion: ,Y
This case presents another aspect of the perplexing problem of reconciling
basic principles of justice with military needs in wartime. Individual rights have
been recognized by our jurisprudence only after long and costly struggler.
They should not be struck down by anything less than the gravest necessit:'.
We assent to their temporary suspension only to the extent 'that they: con:
stitute a clear and present danger to the effective prosecution of the war and
only as a means of preserving those rights undiminished for ourselves and
future generations.
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
30. Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) stated that the 1971 Selective Service Act was
"indispensable to the maintenance of our security and the conduct of our foreign policy."
117 CONG. REc. 14683 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1971).
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are normally retirement age, middle-class, and conservative.3' Minority
groups are so poorly represented on draft boards that it is misleading
to use the term "represented."32 The composition'of the local boards
is not a peripheral concern, because the boards operate with vast discre-
tion and low public visibility. Abuses occur frequently. 3 A categoriza-
tion of abuses would require a separate article, but the most promi-
nent merit mention.
First, the composition and autonomy of the boards insure that
only a small percentage of Conscientious Objector applicants will
actually be granted CO classifications.3 4 As one commentator noted:
Since most local boards considered applying for a CO classifica-
tion to be no better than burning one's draft card, they constantly
denied CO requests and subsequent appeals. Over 50% of the war re-
sisters in Canada might not have gone there had draft boards even
bothered to abide by the original Seeger decision.es
Second, the procedures of the System do not meet essential stand-
ards of fairness under the due process clause: representation by at-
torneys has been forbidden; 6 neither local boards nor appeal boards
are required to give reasons for their decisions;37 there is no opportu-
nity to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses;3 8 and it is doubtful
that draft board hearings are permitted at a reasonable time.30 These
defects existed prior to the Vietnam war, but the demands of the war
31. F. STEVENS, IF TnIs BE TREASON 60 (1970). The average age of a draft
board member is 63.6 years. Id.
32. Of the roughly 16,000 board members in the United States, 1.3% arc blacks,
0.8% are Puerto Ricans, 0.7% are Orientals, and 0.1% are American Indians. Id.
33. That such abuses are intolerable when a board literally has the life of the
registrant in its hands is obvious. See Walsh v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
34. R. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 41.
Former draft board member James Bailey cited an example of the bias toward
CO applications. A youth seeking CO status who was Catholic was told by a board
member, "Well, I'm a Catholic too and I'm not a conscientious objector. Are you a better
Catholic then me?" Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1972, at 3, col. 2.
35. Id.
36. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1949).
37. See id. §§ 1623.4, 1624.2(d), 1625.4, 1626.27 (a), 1626.31(b) (1949).
38. See id. §§ 1623.1(b), 1624.2(b) (1949).
39. See id. §§ 1624.1, 1624.2 (1949). As one commentator observed:
It is not likely that a favorable decision could come from a reluctantly
performed belated interview which would require from the local board a formal
reversal of its previous formal classification, implying an admision that such
previous action was unjustified.
Silard, Some Comments on the Local Board Memorandum No. 41 Pre-Classification
Interview, 2 S.S.L.R. 4001, 4004 (1969).
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caused the System to stagger "with resultant secretiveness and indeed
recalcitrance. A 'fair hearing' in most boards became an unattain-
able illusory concept of the law makers." 40
Third, the System has been utilized to accomplish objectives other
than inducting young men into the army. The draft has been used
to "channel" men into life styles determined by the government, 4' and
it has been used as a weapon to stifle dissent.4
Finally, of course, the draft has been used to provide manpower
for American intervention in a foreign conflict. It was the draft that
made the Vietnam war possible.48
II. THE WAR IN VIETNAM
A. United States Entry and Conduct in the War: Illegal and
Unconstitutional
,Three compelling arguments that United States involvement in
the war is illegal require brief examination: that the United States has
violated international law in intervening in Vietnam; that the United
40. Hansen, The Basis-in-Faat Test in Judicial Review of Selective Service Classi-
fications: A Critical Analysis, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 453, 470 (1971).
A member of the Bethesda-Chevy Chase, Md., Local Board No. 54 recently wrote
a letter to the board president urging that registrants be permitted representation by
attorneys at board hearings. Board member James Bailey wrote that providing counsel
was "the only way to correct the shocking reputation we have for lack of fairness," and
that lawyers were necessary because "the horrors we inflict on young men in what we
dare to call a hearing are so well known." Bailey also told the board president that he
was appealing for representation for registrants "in the name of all our neighbors' sons
we have sent to be killed or maimed illegally."
Bailey was suspended from the board by the national director of the Selective
Service System three months after writing the letter. Draft Unit Critic Is Suspended,
Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1972, ,§ C, at 1, col. 8.
41. If the government deems it desirable to increase the number of teachers, for
example, it simply defers teachers from the draft. Thus, the System is an ideal
mechanism for "channeling" men into jobs deemed desirable by the state.
42. The most famous incidents concerning the draft and dissent occurred in 1965
and 1966 when Selective Service Director Hershey decided to use his position to uni-
laterally stop anti-war demonstrations. At that time he stated, "[r]eclassification is
quicker at stopping sit-ins than some indictment that takes effect six months later .. .
and we haven't heard of any sit-ins since the one in Ann Arbor." NEw REPUBLic, Dec.
25, 1965, at 7.
43. As former Senator Ernest Gruening observed, "It was the draft that made it
possible for our leaders to deceive the American people into the longest, costliest, least
justifiable and most unpopular war in our history." 117 CONG. REc. 14684 (daily ed.
Sept. 21, 1971).
An author concurred: "Undeclared and unpopular wars can never be fought
10,000 miles from a nation's boarders without a means of forcing men to go, a system
of enslavement whereby young men are forced to serve the state and do its dirty
work ... R." . WILLIAMAS, supra note 2, at 4.
319.
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States has violated the Constitution in intervening in Vietnam; and
that the United States has violated international law in its conduct of
the war.
First, there is evidence that the United States has violated treaty
obligations and international law. The United States is a party to a
number of non-aggression treaties, 44 and also has ratified the Agreement
of London, which stipulates that "planning, preparation, initiation, or
waging of war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements, or assurances" is criminal.45 Furthermore, this
nation is a party to the United Nations Charter: "All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state .... '46 The United States' intervention in Vietnam clearly con-
travenes these relevant provisions of international law.
Article IV of the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty notes that a
member may "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes."'47 Even assuming that an internal struggle in
a small nation thousands of miles from the United States somehow pres-
ents a "common danger" to the world's most powerful nation, Amer-
ica has not acted in "accordance with its constitutional processes."
Thus, the second argument arises: United States intervention in
Vietnam is unconstitutional. The power of Congress to declare war is
absolute.48 The position of Commander-in-Chief was never intended
to confer the power to declare war,49 and the Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that under the separation of powers doctrine only Con-
44. Pan American Conference, 49 Stat. 3363 (1933), T.S. No. 906; Kellog-Briand
Pact, 46 Stat. 2343 (1928), T.S. No. 796; Hague Conventions, 36 Stat. 2199 (1907),
T.S. No. 536; 32 Stat. 1779 (1899), T.S. No. 392.
45. Agreement of London, 59 Stat. 1544 (1945), E.A.S. No. 472; Judgment &
Sentences of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (Govt Printing Office
1947).
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
47. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 81,
83, T.I.A.S. No. 3170.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 11.
49. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States. In this respect, his authority would be nominally the same with
that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance, much inferior to it. It
would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction
of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Con-
federacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to
the raising and regulating of fleets and armies-all of which, the Constitution
under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 448 (Modem Library ed. 1941) (A. Hamilton).
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gress can declare war.5° Congress has not declared war on North Viet-
nam. This is an "executive" war which directly conflicts with the
United States Constitution. 51
The government has advanced "justifications" for the war, but
they are more notable for their numbers than their merit.5 2 These
"justifications" have been analyzed elsewhere,5 3 but the two most sub-
stantial arguments should be noted.
First, the executive branch has claimed that Congressional adop-
tion of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was the "functional equiva-
lent" of a declaration of war.54 The history of the resolution belies that
view. In 1964 President Johnson emphasized that "our purpose is
peace ... the United States seeks no wider war." 55 Senators who spon-
sored the resolution also made it clear that it was not a declaration
of war.5 6 In addition, there are strong indications that Congress was
deceived by the executive branch in the portrayal of the Tonkin inci-
dent.57 Hence, even if it is supposed that Congress intended to author-
50. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 635, 668 (1862); The Amelia, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). See also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
51. "It is no more than a usurpation by the Executive of the power possessed
only by Congress." Faulkner, The War in Vietnam: Is It Constitutional?, 56 GEO. L.J.
1132, 1136 (1968).
Mr. Justice Story's analysis indicates that this nation's founders were attempting
to avoid Vietnams when they insisted that Congress have the power to declare war.
Story even proposed a system whereby two-thirds concurrence of the House and the
Senate would be required to declare war, to insure that it "be difficult in a republic
to declare war; but not to make peace." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 89-90 (2d ed. 1851).
52. Eighteen government "justifications" are analyzed by Lawrence Velvel in a
comprehensive article on the constitutionality of the war, and all are quite vulnerable.
Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attack-
able, 16 KAN. L. Rtv. 449 (1968).
53. Id. See also Faulkner, supra note 51.
54. Velvel, supra note 52, at 472-73.
55. 110 CONG. REc. 14801-02 (daily ed. June 23, 1964).
56. Senator Brewster asked Senator Fulbright (the Senate sponsor of the resolu-
tion) if the resolution would approve "the landing of large American armies in Vietnam
or China." Senator Fulbright replied: "There is nothing in the resolution, as I read
it, that contemplates it. I agree with the Senator that it is the last thing we would
want to do." Velvel, supra note 52, at 473.
57. The omissions and distortions of fact during the 1964 hearings were so
frequent, so skillful, that one must suspect something more sinister than
honest misunderstanding or accidental verbal vagueness . . . . Deception is
deception, be it deliberate or unwitting, and the facts warrant conviction of
the Johnson administration on this count-both for its recitation of the
facts of the August 4 incident to Congress in 1964, and for its use thereafter
of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
J. GOULDEN, TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIR-
ILLUSION AND REALITY 19 (1969).
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ize war, its authorization would be void. Most important, however,
is the fact that a resolution which delegated Congress' power to de-
clare war to the President would be unconstitutional. Congress may
not delegate away its Constitutional powers.58
Second, the executive branch contends that Congressional appro-
priations for the armed forces constitute the equivalent of a declara-
tion of war. However, many Congressmen who opposed the war never-
theless felt compelled to provide support for troops already in Viet-
nam.59 Furthermore, the appropriations justification conflicts with a
Supreme Court ruling that explicit authorization is required in
cases where executive action is of dubious constitutionality to insure
careful and purposeful consideration by those responsible for
enacting and implementing our laws. Without explicit action by law-
makers, decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be
relegated by default to administrators who, under our system of gov-
ernment, are not endowed with any authority to decide them.00
Thus, logical analysis compels the conclusion that United States
intervention in Vietnam is unconstitutional, even though the Su-
preme Court has not acted on the failure of the executive branch to
abide by the Constitution.61
The third contention of American illegal action in Vietnam con-
cerns the violation of the laws of land warfare. The United States is a
party to treaties regulating the conduct of war,62 and the continued
bombings of North Vietnam which result in death to civilians are vio-
lations of those treaties. Other American activities, such as "search
and destroy" missions, are conceivable violations as well. These viola-
tions impinge directly on individual soldiers, since the soldier is re-
58. Velvel, supra note 52, at 478.
59. Senator Richard Russell, in his opening statement on the Supplemental
Appropriations Bill on February 16, 1966, stated:
It is important that the Senate and the Nation clearly recognize this bill
for what it is: an authorization of defense appropriations. It could not properly
be considered as determining foreign policy, as ratifying decisions made in the
past, or as endorsing new commitments.
Malawer, The Vietnam War Under the Constitution: Legal Issues Involved in the
United States Military Involvement in Vietnam, 31 U. PiTt. L. Rv. 205, 230 (1969).
60. Greenev. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959).
61. The argument concerning the justiciability of the constitutional challenge to
the war cannot be made within the confines of this article. See Velvel, supra note 52, at
480.
62. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949 [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2199 (1910), T.S. No. 536.
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sponsible for his actions even if he is ordered to commit illegal acts
by a superior.6 3 Where a common design is established, all persons im-
plementing the common design are guilty of war crimes: "The United
States by committing war crimes in Vietnam makes all participating
soldiers guilty under international law."164
B. Non-Legal Arguments Against United States Involvement in
the War
The non-legal arguments against American participation in the
war in Vietnam are too well-known to require elaboration: that there
was no valid reason for American involvement since no vital interests
were in jeopardy;65 that the United States intervened on the "wrong"
side of a civil war, supporting the colonialists instead of those seeking
freedom and independence; 66 that the United States has been fighting
for a corrupt South Vietnamese government;67 that the human costs
of the war have been only peripheral concerns of United States policy
makers;68 that the war is a racist war; that it is an immoral war; that it
is simply "wrong.' 69 In fact, at least two United States Senators have
termed the war the biggest mistake in American history.70
63. O'Brien, Selective Conscientious Objection and International Law, 56 GEO.
L.J. 1080, 1087-89 (1968). A soldier can be tried for violations of the laws of warfare
even though he is acting within domestic law. The Nuremburg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69,
110-11 (1946).
64. Faulkner, supra note 51, at 1142.
65. Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.): "What for? Why? We will never be able
to answer that question to our satisfaction, and we know it." 117 CONG. REc. 15562
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1971).
66. Senator Vance Hartke (D-Ind.): "We must realize that President Nixon's
position is not a passing fancy. For 17 years he has tried to get the United States to
shore up the French colony in Vietnam or, failing that, to establish our own in South
Vietnam." Id. at 15578.
67. Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.): "There may be some Members of this body
who know how to explain to their constituents why, in the name of the Vietnamese right
of self-determination, we should continue to support a tyrant who is now destroying that
right. I do not." Id. at 15568.
68. Senator Fulbright: "Most of all-and in this respect the Pentagon papers
have been most revealing-our policymakers have given short shrift to the human costs
and consequences of the war both for the American people and the people of Indo-
china." Id. at 15575.
69. Senator Pell (D-R.I.): "[I]t is tragically clear that this is a wrong war, fought
in the wrong place at the wrong time, a war in which this Nation should never have
become involved." Id. at 15576-77. A Harris Survey in 1971 reported that "58 percent
[of those Americans polled in a representative survey] considered it morally wrong for
the U.S. to be fighting in Vietnam." War Debate, 31 FACTS ON FILE 291 (1971).
70. Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.): "Mr. President, I will repeat, first-although
I said this before-the Vietnam war is the worst single mistake the United States of
America has ever made." Id. at 15564.
Senator Frank Moss (D-Utah): "The tragic war in Southeast Asia has been the
most disastrous chapter in American history." Id. at 15573.
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The validity of the foregoing arguments cannot be debated within
the confines of this article. It is sufficient to note that many of the
arguments have been accepted by a majority of Americans, 71 as well as
by draft evaders and deserters.72
III. SUMMARY: CONSCRIPTION AND THE WAR
Strong arguments indicate that the draft is not congruent with con-
stitutional concepts, that it is totalitarian, and that it is administered
arbitrarily and unjustly. Equally persuasive arguments indicate that
United States military involvement in Vietnam is illegal under inter-
national law, illegal under domestic law (because it is unconstitu-
tional), and illegal under international rules of warfare. Furthermore,
similarly potent arguments indicate that both the draft and the war
are immoral for a civilized people.
IV. THE QUESTION OF AMNESTY
A. The Rationale for Unconditional, Universal Amnesty
With such an array of impressive arguments dictating against
one's participation-particularly forced participation-in the war, it
is not surprising that there are thousands of Americans in exile who
refused to fight. Nor is it surprising that the question of amnesty for
these exiles has been raised in public discussion.
The authority to grant amnesty is vested in both the President
and Congress, 73 but virtually all amnesties in American history have
71. A 1970 Harris poll revealed that Americans preferred terminating United
States involvement in the war over declaring war by a 2 to I margin. L. HARRIS & Asso-
CIATES, THE HARRIS SURVEY YEARBOOK OF PUBLIC OPINION 1970 114 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as SURVEY].
72. The comments of this draft resister are typical:
There we are in Vietnam-as in a few other places, supporting a totally
corrupt government. A totally undemocratic government. We put it in power.
And we're doing it to hold back the Communists. Because they're undemocratic.
Because they're repressive. And how are we supporting this corrupt, represssive
government? By burning human beings with napalm.
F. STEVENS, supra note 31, at 120-21.
73. Presidential authority to grant amnesties and general pardons is derived from
the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Congress may also issue amnesties:
Although the Constitution vests in the President "power to grant reprieves
and pardons for offenses against the United States . . ." this power has never
been held to take from Congress the power to pass acts of general amnesty ....
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896).
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been proclaimed by the President 4 George Washington granted the
first amnesty in 1795,75 and twelve Presidents since that time have
granted amnesties. 70 Thus, as President Nixon noted 7 7 America has
a tradition of granting amnesties following wars and insurrections. An
amnesty for Vietnam draft evaders and deserters would be only a
continuation of that tradition.7 However, the case for amnesty for
the Vietnam exiles rests on stronger ground than mere precedent.
First, draft evaders were forced to act on their conviction that the
draft was wrong-a conviction, as we have seen, shared by the men
who founded this nation. If the unjust infringement on personal liberty
is ever justified, it certainly was not justified to provide cannon fodder
for Vietnam. To punish an individual for refusing to obey an unjust
law will only compound the cruelties caused by the war in Vietnam.
Second, the exiles also were forced to act on their convictions
that the war was wrong. Most Americans-including public officials-
did not have to "vote" with their lives on the legality and morality of
participation in the war.79 The exiles, however, were forced to act on
their opposition to the war-and they now face punishment if they
return to the United States. Such punishment should either be meted
out to all Americans who oppose the war, or to none.
Third, retaining sanctions against returning exiles constitutes an
unjust selective enforcement of the draft law. It must be emphasized
74. In 1898, Congress passed an amnesty act which removed the final disabilities
from former Confederate soldiers. 30 Stat. 432.
75. A "full, free, and entire pardon to all persons" participating in the 1795
Whiskey Rebellion was granted on July 10, 1795. 1 J. RcHARDsoN, COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 173 (1897).
76. Id. 293-94 (Adams); id. 413 (Jefferson); 2 id. 497, 499, 528 (Madison); 3
id. 1062-63 (Jackson); 8 id. 3414-16, 3419 (Lincoln); id. 3508-10, 9 id. 3895 (A. John-
son); 10 id. 4189 (Grant); 15 id. 6690-92 (T. Roosevelt); 18 id. 8317-19 (Wilson).
See also 43 Stat. 1940 (1924) (Coolidge); 48 Stat. 1725 (1933) (F. Roosevelt); 11
Fed. Reg. 14645 (1946), 12 Fed. Reg. 8731 (1947), 17 Fed. Reg. 11833 (1952)
(Truman).
77. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1972, at 19. However, President Nixon has strongly in-
dicated that he will not follow the acknowledged tradition. During the Presidential
campaign of 1972, the President indicated that "he still opposed amnesty for U.S.
military deserters." The President said, "Those who chose to desert must pay the penalty
that they have earned." N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1972, at 47, col. 1.
78. Many Americans apparently would like to break with tradition. A recent
Gallup Poll indicated that 60 percent of the public were opposed to unconditional
amnesty. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1972, at 26, col. 6.
79. It is particularly difficult to understand how a Senator could oppose the draft,
oppose the war, and yet oppose amnesty, such as Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.)
and Senator John Tunney (D-Cal.). Letters from Senator Richard Schweiker and
Senator John Tunney to William Wick, Jan. 27, 1972 and Jan. 19, 1972, on file in the
editorial offices of the Buffalo Law Review.
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that "almost every kid in this country is either a draft evader, a poten-
tial draft evader, or a failed draft evader."80 Most young men evade
the draft without the fanfare accorded to those who go to Canada-
they avoid it "legally." The number of ways to avoid the draft are
legion,"' and range from artificially inducing high blood pressure to
hunting the American eagle in Colorado. 2 (It is a felony to hunt the
American eagle, and convicted felons cannot be drafted.) Doctors find
illnesses,83 and lawyers find loopholes.84 Thus, if the spirit of the Se-
lective Service Law were to be enforced, few young men would be
seen walking American streets. The essential difference between the
draft evader in exile and the draft evader in America is one of honesty:
the man in exile refused to fake a disability and he refused to become
a minister solely to avoid the draft, while the man in America cut
comers and managed, somehow, to evade the draft "legally."8 In addi-
tion, large numbers of draft evaders and deserters are now being
80. Comments of a draft evader in F. STEVENS, supra note 31, at 229.
81. Don't quit college whatever you do, or you'll lose your student defer-
ment. Nurse along that trick ankle, make sure it's still bad enough to keep
you out when you go for your physical. Keep your name down on the waiting
list for the Guard, the Reserve. Find a job in a corporation doing defense work,
have them pull strings to get you that occupational deferment. Study to become
a minister-you don't actually have to BE one. Find a psychiatrist who will
write the Golden Letter to your draft board saying you're unfit for service.
Id. at 36.
82. More extreme methods have been employed, however:
[E]very year at least a few desperate young men slice off one-half of either
thumb. And in New York a nineteen-year-old shot himself in the right foot with
his .22 caliber rifle, smashing several bones. He will limp for the rest of his
life, but feels it is a reasonable price to pay for making sure he doesn't die
fighting in a war "that doesn't accomplish anything but shoot, burn, and starve
Vietnamese peasants to death."
Id. at 72-73.
83. The young have mastered the art of beating the draft with medical or
psychiatric excuses. Doctors do not invent diseases but look extra hard for
disabilities that disqualify their patients. Letters are not always necessary.
Many healthy registrants have skipped a doctor's help and still faked their way
to 4-F or 1-Y status.
TIME, Nov. 16, 1970, at 67.
84. Los Angeles attorney David Caplan stated:
Without doing anything illegal or extralegal, we are able to keep 991
of the people who walk in here out of the.., draft.
There are thousands of disqualifying physical and mental conditions, and
it's a rare case that someone does not have one of them ....
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1970, at 28.
85. Individuals escaping the draft by cutting corners often respect those with the
courage to be honest and go to Canada. "I thought of going to Canada like my brother,
but I guess I'm just not . . . as principled as he is," said one person who evaded
legally. F. STEVErNs, supra note 31, at 57.
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ignored by the government: the law itself is not equally enforced.8 6
To penalize the exile while hundreds of thousands of others subverted
the law or escaped punishment because of arbitrary enforcement, is to
punish for his honesty, not his crime.
Fourth, the United States forced young men into exile by pre-
senting them with an insoluble dilemma: either they violate the draft
law or they violate their consciences, international law, and the rules
of war. 7 The most logical, most humane, most conscionable course
of action was to violate the Selective Service law.8 That course of
action, however, was the one to which a legal sanction certainly at-
tached, whereas violations of conscience, international law and the
rules of war were not likely to result in punishment. A situation in
which an individual is forced by the state to choose between undesira-
ble, illegal alternatives should not be tolerated in an advanced society. 9
Fifth, many draft registrants were denied due process of law by
the Selective Service System and consequently lost deferments as well
as faith in the fairness of the System. To penalize exiles who were
forced to leave because of unfair or illegal actions of their draft boards
is to punish individual citizens for the failures of the Selective Service
System.
Sixth, many exiles attempted to receive a Conscientious Objector
classification, but failed because (1) the draft board did not grant
many CO's or (2) the registrant, although passionately opposed to the
Vietnam war, was not opposed to all wars. To punish these exiles is
also to punish for the failures of the System-a system which func-
86. "Many deserters, perhaps a majority, are already being quietly discharged,
mostly because many military commands are unwilling to go through complicated
prosecution procedures." TW E, Jan. 10, 1972, at 17.
87. For some there is a third option, which has already been described: evading
the draft "legally" in the United States.
88. If Selective Service law is violated, only the individual suffers. If an individual
goes to Vietnam, the chances are great that he will inflict injury and suffering on
numerous other people.
89. As former Senator Ernest Gruening put it:
By now our young people know that our nation was lied into this war.
(Some of us knew it before the publication of the Pentagon papers.) Quite
properly [they] object to being compelled to fight in a war in which no vital
American interest is in jeopardy, to kill people against whom they feel no
grievance, participate in what has become a mass slaughter of civilians, and
maybe to get killed or maimed in the process. But if they refuse to go, if
they follow their consciences, they face imprisonment at hard labor with all
the disastrous consequences for their future.
This is an infamous dilemma to which no citizen of a people that calls
itself "free" should be subject.
117 CONG. Rto. 14684 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1971).
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tioned to so narrowly proscribe the requisites for a CO classification
that it was an unrealistic and normally unobtainable option.
Seventh, it is ironic that this nation proposes to punish the re-
turning exiles who helped alter public opinion and change the course
of the war. Most exiles "saw the light first" and voiced their opposi-
tion to the war loudly and clearly. They voted for Lyndon Johnson, the
peace candidate. Some voted for Richard Nixon, the peace candidate.
They marched and rallied. They changed the course of the war, but not
before they had to "vote" on it with their own lives. The individuals
who first recognized the tragedy of Vietnam and tried to inform the
public about it should be welcomed home.0
Eighth, the traditional reasons for granting amnesty were never
more applicable than they are now. Vietnam has provoked and symbol-
ized the discord and disunity of Americans during the past decade.
The traditional purpose of amnesty is forgetfulness, to "bury the
hatchet."91 We may never fully recover from the agony, the horror, the
tragedy of Vietnam. But we will insure that we will never recover
if we continue to impose criminal sanctions on Vietnam exiles who
wish to return to the United States. 12
Finally, two distinct advantages would accompany the implementa-
tion of an amnesty for Vietnam exiles. First, some of the exiles may de-
sire to return to the United States if they are free to do so.93 There is
an obvious advantage in attempting to salvage the drain on talent
and spirit caused by the draft and the war, for both will be needed
in abundance to begin anew after the war ends. In postwar America,
we will especially need those who were perceptive and independent
enough to question patriotic shibboleths, and those who were honest
enough to go to Canada or someplace else in exile. Second, the people's
90. Even more ironic is the fact that many exiles left the United States because
they felt they could not remain without becoming revolutionaries. R. WILLIANS, supra
note 2, at 39.
91. Knote v. United States, 10 Ct. CI. 397, 407 (1874), aft'd, 95 U.S. 149 (1877).
92. "[A]s these exiles drift back one by one over the years, are the divisions and
animosities of the Vietnam era to be kept alive by repeated prosecutions and jailings for
offenses long past?" Wicker, supra note 7.
93. A number of reports have indicated that the exiles have no desire to return to
the United States, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1972, at 25. However, there are un-
doubtedly thousands who would 'like to return to America, and thousands more who
would like to visit periodically. Perhaps the typical view is articulated by the com-
ments of this draft exile: "Ideally what I'd like to see is an amnesty. I feel we all
deserve an amnesty. That wouldn't mean that I'd go back to the United States right
away. I'd just like to have the right to travel across the border." R. WILLIAAS, supra
note 2, at 195.
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lack of faith in their government and its institutions is probably the
most significant problem confronting America today. An amnesty act
would not singularly reverse this trend. However, it would be an effec-
tive step towards informing citizens that it is possible for the American
government to be just; it is possible for the government to acknowl-
edge mistakes. For many citizens, both possibilities are very much in
doubt at the present time.
B. An Analysis of the Arguments Against Amnesty
Four principal objections have been raised against an amnesty
for draft evaders and armed forces deserters:
(1) It is argued that if amnesty is proclaimed, the United States
will no longer be able to field an army of draftees. 94 There are two re-
sponses to this argument. First, presumably those who cite this argu-
ment are concerned about the effects of amnesty on American armed
forces. If so, the effect of an amnesty on draftees is of little consequence,
because draftees have always constituted only a small percentage of
the total armed forces active duty personnel. 95 Second, President
Nixon has repeatedly stated his intention of establishing an all-volun-
teer army,96 and while his commitment is in doubt, the viability of an
all-volunteer army is not.97 Thus, the quality and quantity of the
United States armed forces will not be diminished by an amnesty.
(2) Opponents of amnesty also contend that the desertion rate
would soar if amnesty were granted.98 This argument is not persuasive
either. First, the desertion rate has already "soared"-354,427 soldiers
have been classified as deserters between 1967 and 1971. 99 Since the
evidence indicates that the draft and the war are largely responsible for
the high desertion rate, it is not reasonable to assume that an amnesty
94. "I have always supported the draft, and I feel that outright amnesty would
demoralize our system of drafting individuals for military service." Letter from Senator
Ernest Hollings to William Wick, Feb. 7, 1972, on file in the editorial offices of the
Buffalo Law Review.
95. R. STAFFORD, F. HORTON, R. SCHWEIKER, G. SHRIVER & C. WHALEN, How
To END THE DRAFT 125 (1967) [hereinafter cited as F. HORTON].
96. President Nixon pledged to end the draft in March, 1967, and again in the
1968 Presidential campaign, but during his first term in office he was one of the most
influential forces against Congressional moves to abolish the draft. R. WILLIAmS, supra
note 2, at 43. During the 1972 Presidential campaign, however, President Nixon again
pledged to end the draft. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
97. F. HORTON, supra note 95. See also THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoM-
MISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE 5-6 (1970).
98. Ti E, Jan. 10, 1972, at 17.
99. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1972, at 26.
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would result in higher rates of desertion. 100 Second, most active duty
personnel are volunteers, and it is not likely that men whose chose to
enter the armed forces will decide to desert even if they believe they
can do so with impunity. Third, even among the draftees in the armed
forces it is extremely unlikely that there are large numbers of soldiers
who would vanish once word of amnesty is received; most likely, the
vast majority of potential deserters have already deserted and are now
in exile.
(3) "Can the government survive if individuals may selectively
disobey the law with impunity?" is another issue raised by amnesty op-
ponents. Presumably their answer is "no," and that is the substance of
their objection.101 In reality, of course, the answer is "yes." Thirteen
Presidents have granted amnesties in the past. The government sur-
vived. If a fourteenth President implemented an amnesty, it would
not result in the destruction of our nation. If used sparingly, amnesty
is an effective instrument for tempering the law with equity and
mercy. If amnesty were granted for a multitude of offenses, of course,
its effect would be diluted and the survival of the government might
become an issue. At the present time, however, it is ridiculous to assert
that we are anywhere near that point. Historically, amnesty has not
involved the issue of selective disobedience of the law. Amnesty has
been granted not to condone selective disobedience, but to "forget"
it.102 Furthermore, since amnesties cannot be forecast, those who vio-
late the law can never be certain that they will benefit from an
amnesty.
Although amnesty does not speak to the issue of selective dis-
obedience of the law, opponents of amnesty have managed to bring the
100. "[T]he desertion rate for the U.S. Armed Forces by 1967 had increased
300 per cent over the normal peacetime rate of the fifties and sixties." R. WILLIAMS,
supra note 2, at 91.
Although among the deserters there were those who fled simply because they were
frightened, the largest group of deserters in Canada are those "who simply object
to war, to being forced in peacetime to fight wars and who, through a common intelligence,
knew that the war in Vietnam was wrong." Id. at 114.
101. "[W]e cannot acquiesce in a system which permits individual citizens to
decide with impunity which laws they will obey and which they will destroy." Letter
from Senator Gordon Allot (R-Colo.) to William Wick, Jan. 17, 1972, on file in the edi-
torial offices of the Buffalo Law Review. "I fear the precedent for the future that Congress
would set if we were to begin to permit individuals or groups to decide for themselves
which laws they could obey, and which they could ignore or violate." Letter from Sena-
tor Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.) to William Wick, Jan. 27, 1972, on file in the editorial
offices of the Buffalo Law Review. See also TimE, supra note 98.
102. Ex parte Law, 35 Ga. 285, 296 (1866).
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issue in through the back door by asserting that amnesty should not be
granted because exiles left the country rather than accept punish-
ment for their illegal resistance. 10 3 Consequently, the problem of se-
lective disobedience should be examined.
Americans have been imbued with the notion that disobedience of
laws which a person considers to be "bad" or "immoral" is wrong,
because such disobedience presumably fosters a general disrespect for
The Law-including, of course, "good" laws vital to the maintenance
of our society. That notion does not withstand analysis, however. As
one observer noted:
But this is like arguing that children should be made to eat rotten
fruit along with the good, lest they get the idea that all fruit should
be thrown away. Isn't it likely that someone forced to eat the rotten
fruit may because of that develop a distate for all fruits? 104
Without developing the argument further, certainly we can posit
that even the most conservative defender of the Rule of Law could
visualize situations in which he would not obey the law. Otherwise,
people would no longer be people-they would be amoral agents of
the State, willing to do its bidding, whatever that may be. Conceding
that some laws should not be obeyed, the defender of the "Rule of
Law" would nevertheless argue that fleeing prosecution is not an avail-
able alternative: a person can attempt to change the law and, failing
that, he must disobey it and accept the consequences. 0 5
Attempting to change undesirable laws and policies is a reason-
able initial approach, but its limitations are glaring when applied to
the Vietnam exile situation. Individuals and groups have tried to
change war policies, using a variety of means in their attempt to do so.
The trend of the war began to change, but the war itself seemed end-
less. In fact, one could imagine the case of an eleven-year-old boy
writing protest letters to his government in 1965, protesting against the
103. Our system of representative democracy could not exist if we accepted
selective obedience to laws, or did not enforce all our laws. We enjoy many
benefits of a free society, including the privileges of influencing public policy
through public debate. But we must also bear the burdens of a free society by
obeying our laws and honoring all the collective restraints that enable each
individual to be free. I fear the precedent for the future that Congress would
set if we were to begin to permit individuals or groups to decide for themselves
which laws they could obey, and which they could ignore or violate.
Letter from Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.) to William Wick, Jan. 27, 1972, on
file in the editorial offices of the Buffalo Law Review.
104. H. ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOcRAcY 12 (1968).
105. TIm, supra note 98.
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war in others ways in later years, and being drafted and ordered to
go to Vietnam in early 1972. That person tried to "change" govern-
mental policies for seven years. Who could honestly tell him that he
must not disobey the law, but try to change it?
Thus, if "change" is ineffective, it is asserted that a person may
disobey the law, but that he must "accept the consequences."' 0 But
why? If a law is ruled unconstitutional, a person who breaks that law
is not required to "accept the consequences." Despite evidence of their
illegality, the draft and the American involvement in the war will ap-
parently never be adjudged by the courts as illegal-but this society
has done everything but formally stamp the draft and the war "il-
legal." The public considers the war a mistake. 0 7 Politicians have dis-
owned the war: our only goal is to get out and to forget as quickly as
possible about our participation and the rationalizations for our par-
ticipation. If the courts have not declared the war illegal, our society
has declared the war "wrong." Consequently, to argue that punish-
ment is required to reinforce some general "Rule of Law" accom-
plishes only one thing: it appeases our "punitive puritan sense of
bureaucratic duty."' 08 Is the "Rule of Law" furthered when the state
continues to punish individuals for refusing to participate in a war
that society has disowned as unjust and immoral? Is it furthered when
an individual is punished because he refused to be jailed for his
convictions about killing in Vietnam? Obviously not. Such actions can
only serve to erode the "Rule of Law."
(4) The final, and most substantial, of the objections to amnesty
is that an amnesty would not be fair to those who fought in Viet-
nam.10 9 Since some men lost their lives in Vietnam, and since some
106. Id. Famous individuals such as Socrates, Ghandi, and Martin Luther King
are often cited as having abided by this principle. In a number of ways, however, the
Vietnam exile may face a problem of a different dimension. As one commentator
observed: "Had Socrates been 18 when he was asked to choose between exile and
hemlock both his reasoning nd the outcome might have been different. Every American
male is faced with his own version of hemlock in the guise of conscription." O'Rourke,
No More Parades, NATION, May 24, 1971, at 662.
107. A Gallup Poll in 1970 determined that a "majority of adults-56 percent-
believe the United States made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam." N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1970, at 4, col. 1.
In 1972, observations were made that "[W]e are approaching a consensus that it
was a mistake from the beginning, that we should have never gotten into it [the Vietnam
war].... ." NATION, Jan. 17, 1972, at 67-68.
108. Widmer, Where Our Writ Doesn't Run, NATION, June 14, 1971, at 762.
109. "How do you justify this legislation to the mother who will never see her
son again; to the widow and children who won't have their father home again . ...
the only answer is that you cannot." Letter from Senator William Saxbe (R-Ohio) to
William Wick, Jan. 28, 1972, on file in the editorial offices of the Buffalo Law Review.
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were disabled, the contention is that it would be unfair to let draft
evaders and deserters return without being punished.
The answer to this emotion-laden argument is two-fold. (1) "Yes,"
it is "unfair," but (2) that is not a relevant argument against amnesty.
Who could successfully argue that it would be "fair" to grant
amnesty to a man who did not fight in Vietnam when his neighborhood
counterpart was inducted, sent to Vietnam, and returned home in a
casket? Or as a paraplegic?
However, can whatever happens to men who survived this tragedy
be "fair"? To answer "yes" would pervert the meaning of the word.
Can returning veterans, much less those who died, be treated "fairly"
relative to the politicians who sent them to the war and to the public
which approved? Clearly, the answer is "no." The simple fact is that
the men who have forfeited their lives and bodies in Vietnam cannot
be compensated for their losses. They were conditioned to obey the
law and respect military and political leaders, accepting without ques-
tion the laws and policies of the nation. Their leaders ordered them
to fight "gooks" and die in Vietnam, and they dutifully went and
fought and died in Vietnam. Their only mistake was a naivit6 about
patriotism, war, the political situation in Indochina, and the foreiga
policy motivations of their country. For that mistake they paid dearly
-and they paid without the traditional solace that they were fighting
"for somethin," and not in vain. American soldiers fought for a cor-
rupt dictatorship in South Vietnam and for a misguided executive in
the United States. They fought and died for a dreadful mistake.
From this perspective, the irrelevance of the "fairness" argument to
the issue of amnesty becomes dear. It is obviously absurd to deny an
exile amnesty because he did not lose his legs in Vietnam. And it is
equally absurd to attempt to artificially create "fairness" by requir-
ing a period of forced national service before an exile may receive
"amnesty."" 0 Vietnam veterans cannot be cornpensated by denying
110. The bills introduced by Senator Taft and Representative Koch require a period
of forced service. The bill introduced by Representative Abzug does not require any
such alternate service. Supra, note 8. Many Senators share the views of Senator Edward
Gurney (R-Fla.): "I would consider supporting an amnesty proposal with certain con-
ditions, and I feel these conditions should be relatively harsh. I am not in sympathy
with those who have left the country to avoid military service, and I think it would
betray those who did not want to go to Vietnam but who did go because they felt it
was their duty to their country." Letter from Senator Edward Gurney to William Wick,
Jan. 21, 1972, on file in the editorial offices of the Buffalo Law Review.
If "harsh" conditions are imposed on those seeking "amnesty," however, it would
not be an amnesty at all, but simply an alteration of the penalties for breaking the law.
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freedom to Vietnam exiles. The government cannot provide arms,
legs, eyes, resurrections, and a return to 1963; nor can it shift the blame
for its mistakes onto the draft evaders and deserters by penalizing the
exiles. All young men who suffered through the agony of Vietnam-
those who went and those who refused to go-have been treated con-
temptuously by this government. To attempt to equalize the suffering
by heaping more "unfairness" on those who refused to go is only a
shallow, pitiful effort by the government to evade its own singular re-
sponsibility for Vietnam and its awful consequences.'11
CONCLUSION
The question that must be faced by the American government
and the American people is whether we have the right "to prevent
them [the exiles] from returning when they have done nothing, in light
of the Vietnam war, which can remotely be called a crime."1 2 There
is no doubt in this writer's mind that draft evaders and deserters will
eventually be regarded as heroes. An amnesty cannot minimize the
tragedy that has already occurred, but it will insure that the mistakes
of the war are not compounded in the war's aftermath. Hopefully, his-
tory books published decades from now will indicate that the heroes of
the Vietnam war were able to return home, honorably, in 1973-with-
out fear of prosecution.
WILLIAM D. WICK*
111. The fact is, of course, that the exiles have suffered through much already.
Establishing a new life in exile and fearing to return home create great emotional
strains. The men who have been forced into exile have already performed their "national
service."
112. R. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 401. The amnesty proposed in this article would
not absolve individuals of crimes other than refusing induction or deserting, but all draft
evaders and deserters automatically would receive amnesty for illegal evasion and deser-
tion. The establishment of tribunals to assess motives and evaluate individual cases would
re-open national wounds instead of binding them, particularly since it was the war which
influenced such a vast majority of exiles to avoid serving. See supra note 100.
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